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BOOK REVIEW
1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801. By Julius Goebel, Jr. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971. Pp. xxv, 864.
6 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction
and Reunion, 1864-88, Part One. By Charles Fairman. New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1971. Pp. xx, 1540. $30 each
($25 by subscription to the entire eleven volumes).
Were an American citizen to bequeath the bulk of his estate to the
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA," such action might indeed be
newsworthy, but certainly not disabling for the recipient. But when
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., did just that, strange things began to happen.
Apparently no dispute arose over the identification of the
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" as the federal government, and
the money was tucked away in the Treasury in a special fund to await
the pleasure of the disbursing agent, the Congress. Over five years
passed before Congress formally recognized its responsibility; then it
passed a resolution providing for the sale of Holmes' residence, the
proceeds of which were to be used to publish a memorial volume including Holmes' writings and to finance the creation of an "Oliver Wendell
Holmes Garden" in Washington, D.C.' Apparently this legislation accomplished nothing beyond the conversion of Holmes' residence into
money, and the Holmes Fund drew neither investment interest nor further political interest for the next decade and a half. Then in 1955 a
committee was appointed consisting of three members each from the
House, the Senate, and the Supreme Court charged with reconsidering
the use of the Holmes Fund. The suggestions of the committee became
the Act of August 5, 1955.2 Carried over into the new legislation was
the provision for the memorial volume, but it was placed at the end of
a list of three priorities and apparently has received no further attention.
The committee had scrapped the idea of a Holmes garden and put in
its place the writing and publication of a history of the Supreme Court
of the United States. The second item provided, as funds were available,
for the financing of an annual series of Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures,
'Joint Resolution of Oct. 22, 1940, ch. 908, 54 Stat. 1206.
2Act of Aug. 5, 1955, ch. 572, 69 Stat. 533.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

which were commenced in 1960 and have continued to the present. A
permanent Committee of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise was established with directions to devote the income and principal, as necessary,
to the history and then, as funds were available, to the second and third
proposals.
The Permanent Committee met first in late 1956 and devised plans
for the history. Paul A. Freund of Harvard was selected as Editor-inChief, and seven chronological volumes were planned with each contributor doing a single volume. Those seven volumes have over the years
expanded to eleven, and the projected coverage to the present has been
cut back so that the final volume will carry the story only to 1941. The
decision to terminate the history in 1941 seems wrong-headed and incomprehensible on any historical or financial grounds. Apparently work
was commenced by the authors in 1958; these two volumes published
in 1971 are the first evidence of these years of effort. To guide the
contributors, the Permanent Committee in its first report in 1957 expressed its hopes for the series:
The Committee has in mind a history that will be comprehensive,
authoritative, and interpretative. It will be self-contained and form an
integrated whole, developing its subject chronologically, in the large
outline, by distinguishable periods in political, economic, and social
history as these are reflected in the work of the Court. Since the
totality of the Court's business is the subject of examination, the investigations will reach far into collateral fields in order to set the Court
at all stages firmly in the political, economic, and intellectual context
of the moment. . . . As a whole, the history will seek to portray the
Court as a living institution, to trace its vital growth and development,
and to show and interpret the interactions between the Court and its
cultural environment over a period of more than a century and a half.'
On the verge of our inspection of the volumes, we might speculate
on how Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., might have reacted to the activity
that his will provoked. This writer of grace and elegance, who believed
brevity to be a virtue, is honored by a mammoth set of books, whose

price, approach, and style assure a most limited audience. Oh, for the
simplicity and beauty of a garden!
A project so long in the making is bound to excite anticipations that
it cannot fulfill, and any multi-volumed, multi-authored series is assured
3

Quoted in The Holmes Devise and the Supreme Court History, 2 Q. LEGAL HISTORIAN,

March 1963, at 4.
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of unevenness in both contemplation and execution. Here, as in so many
other instances, there is little collaboration; what we have is collaboration by segregation and the precise demarking of boundaries, collaboration only in the sense that the total product is the result of many people
working alone, not together. Obviously different authors will produce
different books, but some acceptance of the limitations and guidelines
of the corporate enterprise should reduce the magnitude of the difference. If these two volumes are any indication, what we will get are books
of differing value and approach tied together only by fiat and common
funding. The congressional act contemplated the employment of "one
or more scholars of distinction" for the purpose of preparing the history.
One possibility that apparently was not really explored was the commissioning of a single author or, if the task was too awesome, two, who
could present a unified treatment of more moderate dimensions. Charles
Warren's The Supreme Court in United States History, published in

1922 in three volumes does little with the material beyond the 19th
Century, but it is a well-unified and humanly interesting treatment of
its subject. The fact that it is still in print bespeaks its value with eloquence. Warren had his blind spots, and his reverence for the Court seems
dated to a later generation, but the book has an enduring appeal.
One thing the contributors to this series seemed to agree upon was
the magnitude of their research task. For years the profession heard of
the lengths to which the authors and their assistants were going to turn
up new material that might be useful in their study. The fact that this
material will be collected and made available to scholars is one of the
happy by-products of this effort. But in a study of the Supreme Court,
when so much of the essential material is readily available, the difficult
task is synthesizing the materials into a meaningful manuscript. Certainly the excavating process may, at times, turn up handsome results,
but, without belittling them, they are less important than the major task
of telling the story well. There is some new material in both of these
volumes, along with some rescuing of material not readily available in
other forms, but they contain few surprises or major reinterpretations.
While the two volumes are more different than alike, there are
some important similarities. Both Goebel and Fairman are proven
scholars whose work on this series is revealing of the strengths and
weaknesses of their earlier published work. Lest the moment pass, Goebel and Fairman should be commended and admired for their production of major works long after retirement. Aside from the similar format that one could expect of serial publication, both volumes contain
picture sections consisting primarily of portraits, both are heavily docu-
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mented with extensive footnotes at the bottom of the page, both provide
an uncritical bibliographical listing, and both contain workable, though
not complete, indexes. Finally, both authors show a decided preference
for judicial restraint; in dealing with periods of turbulence, they concur
that a more active Court could have gained little but lost much.
Julius Goebel, Jr., had the unenviable task of beginning the series
with Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. What makes the task difficult
is deciding what properly belongs in a history of the Supreme Court
prior to its creation. Goebel chose to focus on appellate review and its
institutionalization in a society particularly sensitive to the need to limit
government by codifying the fundamental law. In examining the colonial period and the imperial appellate structure, Goebel concludes "that
the colonists' grasp of the law and its operations was broadly based.",
The colonists conceived the common law as a standard by which a
claimed usurpation of liberty could be tested, and when the controversy
with Great Britain entered its final phase, "it was with solid shot from
the magazine of common law precedent that the American cause was
chiefly vindicated."15 By the Revolution the idea of a constitution was a
matter of political conviction, and everything "in the experience of the
American lawyers, intellectual and practical, had prepared the way for
committing"' the power of determining conformity or repugnancy to the
Constitution to the judiciary. From there Goebel moves on to a discussion of the new states and their judicial organizations. Then in an interesting chapter on "national judicial authority" during the period from
1775 to 1789, he fills in a gap in our understanding of practice under
the Continental Congress and the Congress under the Articles of Confederation.
Goebel's two-hundred page treatment of the drafting and ratifying
of the Constitution is largely focused on the judiciary, and though his
limited focus can be questioned, he does provide some new insight.
Facing the same inadequate discussion of the judiciary in the Philadelphia Convention that has puzzled researchers, he comes to an interesting
conclusion. He attributes the inadequate discussion of the judicial article
to the fact that the establishment of a national judiciary was a theoretical necessity once you start, as the framers did, with a commitment to
the separation of powers principle. This logical deduction commended
U. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1971).
11d. at 95.
61d.

47 (1

HISTORY OF THE SUPREME

19721

BOOK REVIEW

itself to all; in the absence of dispute no defense was necessary. Controversy was, however, provoked over the insistence that a provision for
an inferior federal court structure be lodged in the Constitution. James
Madison lost the battle but won the war with a provision that apparently
gave to the Congress discretion to establish such courts. Goebel goes
further and contends that revisions in language in the Committee of
Style, where "ordain and establish" was substituted for "constitute,"
left Congress little real discretion.
Goebel's chapter on the Bill of Rights necessitates some digression
from his main focus, but he quickly gets back to his narrower history
in two chapters that deal with the Judiciary Act of 1789 and supplementary procedural legislation. In these chapters and throughout the book,
Goebel demonstrates that he can grapple with procedural matters as
well as, if not better than, any other legal historian. His treatment of
the significant Judiciary Act of 1789 provides some correction to
Charles Warren's famous and influential treatment of it. His next two
chapters on the Circuit Courts are useful and informative and provide
the best coordinated treatment of them in print. The final 132 pages are
devoted to the Supreme Court in the first decade of its existence, supplemented by an appendix collating the material unearthed on the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court to 1801. Much of the case material in the
volume concerns admiralty cases, and Goebel has done a good job in
tracing the intricacies of this jurisdiction throughout the volume. He
concludes that within "the confines of what the Court considered to be
the bounds of its authority there was no lack of professional acumen or,
indeed, of moral courage."' 7 That the storms ahead were weathered he
attributes in part to the restraint of this early Supreme Court.
Just as Goebel's volume could be expected to have worth, substance, and insight, it could be expected to have limited appeal. This is
lamentable, for this project, more than any other than Goebel has devoted himself to, had a dimension that offered the author a larger
audience. The book is too narrowly conceived; Goebel's concentration
on appellate review has led him to neglect the more important currents
of thought and activity that went into the making of the Constitution.
Whether or not a study of the Supreme Court can be legitimately separated from constitutional history, a more complete coverage of how and
why we got the Constitution we did is a necessary part of even the more
limited story.
1d. at 792-93.
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Perhaps the failure to develop more fully the period prior to the
framing of the Constitution by considering political philosophy and
practice in a wider setting could be forgiven if, when Goebel reached the
Supreme Court, he treated his subject well and comprehensively. But
this he does not do. At times there is a certain vagueness in Goebel's
discussion of the cases and issues. For instance, in the discussion of the
subject of pensions for Revolutionary soldiers, where congressional legislation gave the federal courts a decision-making power subject to being
overruled by the Treasury Department, a reader of Goebel's treatment
without prior knowledge of the episode would have real difficulty in
understanding the matter and its resolution. And in a significant case
like Calder v. Bull,8 Goebel's treatment is short and neglectful of the
opposing philosophic views on the relationship of the Constitution to
natural law.
Goebel's treatment of Court personnel is arid; what little the volume contains of human interest is generally relegated to the footnotes,
apparently under the assumption that it is irrelevant to the institutional
study. The process of appointment is treated laconically; Washington's
first appointments to the Court are covered in what amounts to only one
page of text. And look at the drama hidden behind this single sentence:
"After the Senate had refused to confirm Rutledge, William Cushing
had been nominated and confirmed but he declined the post because of
age and infirmity."9 The story of John Rutledge is a fascinating one
mixed up with politics and accusations of mental derangement, but
Goebel's footnote conveys little of the total picture. Cushing was Washington's second choice for Chief Justice. Goebel relies on a letter Iredell
wrote to provide an explanation for the refusal, but the episode merits
more attention. Does not the refusal by Cushing, who remained on the
Court until his death in 1810, give us some insight into the office of the
Chief? Such examples of missed opportunity could be multiplied.
Though the Justices' opinions are described, little is said of the men; the
closest Goebel seems to come in saying something meaningful is when
he concludes that James Iredell had "his own characteristic approach '"'
to a case. Goebel, however, does commend Oliver Ellsworth, Washington's third choice for the top spot, for bringing some leadership to a
hitherto leaderless Court, and though his evidence is slim, such
speculation is welcome.
83 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386 (1798).

1J. GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 749.
"Id. at 783.
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Though Goebel follows the letter of the Permanent Committee's
thoughts on the history, he has not caught its spirit. The decade of the
1790's was one of profound importance not only in launching the new
government but in making substantial constitutional decisions. What
the Congress and President did at that time gave operative meaning to
many parts of the Constitution, and, if these decisions did not figure into
contemporary cases, often they established customs that the Supreme
Court generally refused to tackle as open questions when later the subject matter was presented. There is no discussion in the Goebel volume
of the extensive debates of constitutional questions in Congress and in
the executive department. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions are
only cursorily mentioned, and no real attention is paid to the disturbing
Sedition Act of 1798." Goebel does look at the federal legislation from
the perspective of the Circuit Courts when he concludes that the Federalist judges do not deserve the villification that intemperate observers
have heaped upon them for their conduct of the Sedition Act trials.
In short, despite the obvious strengths of Goebel's work, the book
is disappointing when viewed from the perspective of the Permanent
Committee's hope that these volumes would be definitive and selfcontained.
Charles Fairman's volume is quite a different book, even considering the great difference in the eras treated and the difference in the
richness of the materials available. Originally commissioned to write a
single volume in the series covering the years from 1864 to 1888, Fairman soon discovered that his conception of the task would necessitate
its execution in two volumes. So this present book is only Part I and
covers, in the main, the period of Salmon P. Chase's Chief Justiceship,
1864 to 1873.
Fairman's conception of his task, his approach to his material, and
his execution differ markedly from Goebel's. Concentrating mainly on
the subject of Reconstruction in this volume, Fairman has written a
wide-ranging constitutional history. His basic justification is that one
cannot understand how the Court responded in its relatively few cases
to the issues at hand without understanding what the Congress, the
President, and the former Confederate states were doing. He approaches his task by utilizing and quoting at length Congressional debates and private correspondence. Also he recognizes that a study of the
men involved is a matter of human interest and a necessary part of the
"Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
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total history. Though some Justices receive more substantial treatment
than others, we do get some insight into both individual and corporate
decision-making. We see the Supreme Court as part of a total picture
of governmental activity. This is all so positive and such an improvement over Goebel's perspective that the problems of execution in the
volume are all the more disturbing.
Quite simply, the book is too long, too disjointed, and too casually
organized. It cries out for an editor who is in tune with Fairman's
approach but who is ruthless enough to cut its size in half and tighten
its organization. Our plague has been an abundance of writers but a
dearth of creative editors. Difficult though it may be for an author to
scrap material that he has labored over, the final result would be worth
the psychic strain. There are sections of the book that simply should
have been deleted; self-restraint is as applicable to an author as it is to
a Supreme Court Justice. Fairman devotes over fifty pages to a gratuitous showing of how wrong the Supreme Court was in its reading of the
1866 Civil Rights Act 12 in the 1968 case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. 3 Though he uses the cases as a vehicle for describing the legislative
history of the Act, and though this reviewer is inclined to agree that the
Court took the 1866 act out of its historical context, Fairman's excursion is unnecessary; it serves only to reveal the inescapable pitfalls that
await players in the game of discerning legislative intent. Another instance of helpful deletion would have been Fairman's laborious coverage
of Chase's many inconsequential bids for the Presidency. This can only
be understood in light of the fact that Fairman has selected Chase as
the villain of his tale. Aside from such wholesale excisions, the book
could be considerably tightened by pruning the text and eliminating
repetition. Fairman also uses too many quotations. Used sparingly,
quotations can be extremely effective, but heavy reliance on them is a
symptom of indigestion. There is much of worth in this volume, but its
ponderous size and heavy-footedness limits its appeal.
Even recognizing that a coverage of the Supreme Court requires
frequent shifts in subject matter, the book is more disjointed than it had
to be. Part of the problem stems from Fairman's thoroughness, which
leads him to treat a number of cases in catch-all fashion. Reconstruction
is the subject of the first part of the book, and the resulting amendments
to the Constitution, the subject of the last part; this separation of the
"Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
13392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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total story is undesirable. Finally, the overuse of sub-headings leads to
a choppiness and tends, at times, to be a compensation for a failure to
unify the treatment better. If sub-headings do have some independent
value, they should be listed in the table of contents.
Though Fairman's writing style is good, it contains certain patronizing habits. Fairman regularly injects himself into the narrative to tell
the reader that he needs some background information or that he should
pay special heed, for this matter will be raised again. Such "stage directions" are annoying to the reader, who expects the writer's organization
to be unobtrusive and self-sustaining.
Devoting most of this volume to Reconstruction matters, Fairman
is writing in an area that has commanded much scholarly attention, but
except for purposes of note supplementation, he ignores this body of
literature. Every tub, he says, should be allowed "to rest upon its own
bottom."' 4 Yet this body of work can be seen in the background of
Fairman's treatment. For instance, impliedly recognizing that some
historians have labelled the Court's action in refusing to decide Exparte
McCardle15 cowardly, Fairman asks whether the Court's willingness to
bend to efforts to divide it and the Congress would have better served
justice, Fairman's support for deference is clear. In fact he suggests that
tension between Congress and the Court could have been completely
eliminated if the Court had deferred to Congress on the test-oath matter
in Ex parte Garland.'6
Fairman is to be commended for avoiding some of the old questions
that troubled constitutional scholars: did the states secede, were the
states in or out of the Union during the period of Reconstruction, and
what theory can embrace the various actions of the federal government?
An awful amount of print can be expended dealing with these abstract
questions, but such discussion has little meaning in dealing with the
realities of the period. Fairman's approach is a pragmatic one that
realizes that judgments must be passed in light of situations actually
confronted.
Within this framework he writes approvingly of the Court, its hesitation, and its recognition of the realities of power during the course of
Reconstruction. He blames recalcitrant Southern leadership and the
irresponsible course of the Democratic Party in Congress for the mili11C.

FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION,

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

174 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
"71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 533 (1867).

1971).

1864-88,

PART ONE,

at xix (6
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tary measures of Reconstruction. The Court is commended for its refusal to succumb to the intrigues of the disaffected. President Andrew
Johnson took the other course and fared poorly, though Johnson is
praised by Fairman for recognizing his responsibility in executing the
acts he despised. While other interpreters may be willing to listen more
carefully to the claims of injustice, Fairman sees "justice" sullied by its
advocates and is more moved by the needs of the Court to preserve its
viability within the changing federal government.
One strong point of Fairman's volume is its recognition of the part
advocates play in the Court's decisionmaking. So many volumes dealing
with the Supreme Court ignore the lawyers at the bar, but Fairman
recognizes their efforts and their influence within the system. At least
in one instance, though, Fairman over-emphasizes the role of the attorney to the detriment of the issues. Jeremiah S. Black, a leading attorney
hired to contest matters relating to Congressional Reconstruction, is
pictured as a villain seeking to advance the interest of his clients at the
expense of the Court. This is an interesting view, one which focuses not
on the claim but on its propounders.
In evaluating the failure of Reconstruction to advance more substantially the condition of the former slave, Fairman suggests an explanation that may really get to the heart of the matter. He suggests that
the second reconstruction of the 1950's and 1960's was necessary, not
because an earlier generation lacked the conscience or commitment, but
because the power had not yet been recognized in the federal government and the skill necessary for the undertaking of such a substantial
program of organized social service was not present. In spite of cries of
despotism, the federal government was still a considerably limited enterprise in the 1860's and 1870's.
Despite Fairman's eager willingness to defend the Court on Reconstruction matters, he certainly is not an uncritical observer. With the
comfort of a later Court's full concurrence, Fairman castigates the
Court's handling of municipal bond litigation. In a very useful twochapter excursion into the tangled web of municipal bond litigation,
dealing largely with municipal debt incurred in the attempt to encourage
railroad development, he unhesitatingly condemns the Court for its
tendency to protect the bondholders no matter what the cost to legal
doctrine. Justice Samuel F. Miller, a frequent dissenter in these cases,
provides Fairman with a well-reasoned path to follow. Fairman notes a
sloppiness in the Court's handling of certain matters, and he concludes
that "the exercise of corporate responsibility for the work of the Court
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was badly needed at that period."' 7 when loose practice seemed to be
the rule.
A good part of the responsibility for this lack of corporate responsibility Fairman places on the shoulders of the Chief Justice, Salmon P.
Chase. The Court survived Chase, Fairman well might say, but Chase
offered it little help in the struggle. Fairman has nothing good to say
about Chase; he passes over the Chief Justice's role in the impeachment
trial of Andrew Johnson, a performance that has generally earned
Chase plaudits, with no comment. Fairman condemns Chase for his
constant courting of the Presidential nomination, his political lobbying,
and his failure to exercise his office responsibly. As previously mentioned, Fairman expends considerable space on the straw-grasping that
characterized Chase's bid for the Presidency. He demonstrates how
Chase acted unilaterally on matters that concerned the Court as a
whole, including his search for glory in getting Congress to retitle his
office, Chief Justice of the United States. As part of a package deal, he
supported reduction in the size of the Court in return for a substantial
increase in salary, and he suggested measures to provide patronage for
the judicial office. Chase probably failed to become the leader of the
Court not because of incapacity but because of a lack of interest. Fairman holds Chase directly responsible for the legal tender controversy
that saw the Court do a flip-flop on the question of constitutionality.
Fairman contends that Chase had a political interestin in finding the
legislation unconstitutional and that the matter was too important to
rest on the deciding vote of an inconsistent and senile Justice Robert C.
Grier. No one would suggest that Chase was a great judicial officer, yet
this reviewer believes that an historian less unsympathetic to Chase
might present a better balanced picture of the man and the Chief Justice.
In addition to providing much information on the individual members of the bench and the bar, Fairman does a fine job of tracing the
intricacies of Supreme Court litigation and giving a full analysis of the
major, and some interesting minor, cases of the period. From this treat9 there is a
ment of ExparteMcCardle8 to the Slaughter-House Cases,"
fullness of treatment. In addition, Fairman has chased down some interesting cases that never came before the Court for opinion; they add
considerably to the total picture. The thoroughness of the volume may
lessen its readability, but it is a boon to scholars in the period, even those
17C. FAIRMAN, supra note 14, at 662.
1174 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
"183 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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who will take issue with Fairman's interpretations.
If these two volumes are representative of the total series, each will
bear a very distinctive stamp. Since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized diversity and at times celebrated its virtues, perhaps such a composite history of the Supreme Court is not an inappropriate memorial
after all.
JOHN E. SEMONCHE
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND LECTURER IN LAW
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
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